Explosion
and sinking of INS Sindhurakshak, a conventional Indian Submarine in Mumbai harbor shocks the world. Is it another case of
system failure?
The recent explosion on an Indian Navy submarine in Mumbai (Bombay) harbor and its subsequent sinking with the tragic loss of 18 service men of the elite submarine force of India has been in the news. Before migrating to the USA I saw served in the Indian Navy's submarine arm including on India's first nuclear submarine. The views in subsequent paragraphs are based on my experience and now my expertise on the system approach.
The
submariners in India have for long not been recognized or given the respect due
to them. There are several reasons for this, what goes up can be seen and is
glamorous as the Indian Air Force (IAF).
The Indian Army has visibility; it has been the guardian of the country
and perhaps the only insurance against the corrupt and unscrupulous politicians
in keeping India secure. So there is respect for the army, and to an extent a commitment
to supporting it. In the case of the
Indian Navy the understanding of its need and the national commitment to it has
been scanty and inconsistent.
India
is a peninsula jutting into the ocean with an ocean named after it. No other
country really has an ocean named after it. India has this privilege. Has
always had it, but never realized it and consequently appreciated the value of
protecting the sea front. The strategies of keeping sea lanes open have not been
appreciated by the intelligentsia, then what to talk of the large population
living in poverty and preoccupied in making two ends meet.
Submarining
and its risks are not really appreciated by the mass of India. There are
virtually no family members of any elite or politicians in the armed forces
then what to talk of any of them serving in the submarines. The elitist respect comes from the public
understanding and appreciating the sacrifices of those at sea and more so under
water. What goes up may come down, but what goes down may never come down!
In
Russia, where I trained with the command team for the first nuclear submarine, in every house the third toast is drunk to all those at sea and then to
submariners. Armed
forces from Chandragupta Maurya's time were respected and integral to the advice
provided by Chanakya to the rulers. The
degradation of the political set up has over the period put those in power who
do not really value the services. Some of them laugh at them forgetting that
they are secure to play their dirty games because the services keep the nation
secure.
Some
of India's politicians and rich and affluent visiting the US should spend less time
in malls and perhaps a few hours in the Arlington Cemetery! The next time they
are in US they should spend time studying the respect any great nation should
have for those who protect the nation. I
say all this not out of context to this tragic incidence, but because this lack
of support from the nation has a great bearing on such accidents. The scenario
results in a demotivated service, always thinking of those all around enjoying
the bliss of corruption. Sometimes even regretting the choice of their careers,
whilst these committed submariners go around Mumbai on their bicycles cursing
the misery of their difficult life with no national support to them or their
families. This
results in mediocrity in services. No one or very few really joins the service
as a first choice.
The weaponry and
platforms are sophisticated and require a committed manpower enjoying
what they do.
Against
that backdrop consider the responsibilities the services have. Every
time India has lost her freedom it has been when she was attacked from the
sea. Those who came from the land routes invariably stayed and got absorbed
into the system. So
there is this dichotomy between expectations and responsibilities on
one side, and the demoralized work force trying to run around
Mumbai competing with the rich and affluent.
These
tragic accidents need to be analyzed against this back ground.
Torpedoes do
not detonate and explode if the processes and procedures are correctly
followed. If the officers and men work as a team. Train and drill with
enthusiasm. These sad incidents are indicative of a system failure and do not
auger well for the future unless the system is reviewed. The review of course
must not start at the check stage of the P-D-C-A cycle (Plan- Do- Check- Act).
It must take the country to the Plan stage and then back to what and how they
want to implement a strong armed forces and then go on to the Check and Act
stages.
Indian
system has run since independence guaranteed as insurance by
the efficiency of the armed forces. That the strategic thinking, the
national policy should take this into account and be discussed by the intelligentsia,
debated by the nation not only in its parliament but in public forums. For this clear policy then will create the organization ready to create the system which will ensure efficiency and meet national objectives.
Regrettably
in India none of this is analyzed publicly. If anything everyone has a
stake in hiding the truth. The bureaucrats and the services and the
politicians will blame each other for not funding and talk about lack of spares et all or blame some individuals. Perhaps the Commanding Officer of the
submarine or the Commodore commanding these submarines and so on will be blamed.
And if at all they are to blame, then the system too must take the blame and
admit they have placed incorrect personnel in positions of national decisions
making. In case the system for the selection is incorrect then the individual cannot be at fault. The root cause has to be searched elsewhere. In either case the system is to blame. As Dr. Deming stated “a badsystem will defeat a good person every time”.
The nation itself by and large does not
involve itself in the discussion. If it did it would see that the sacrifice of these
18 soldiers who were doing their duty to the nation will not go waste. In my
opinion this is not an individual failure. It is a system failure. The absolute
top management should take the responsibility. The defense minister and then down the line should analyze the system failure which has its fountainhead at the Top Management. The Defense Minister is the top management for the defense forces or not? Has the system
failed or not?
It
is not a system failure at the submarine level (INS Sindhurakshak – Protector of
the Seas), or at the entire submarine arm level or at the navy level, but at a
national level. The nation is failing the services and so the resourcing in
every form (manpower or hardware or software) is lacking and being worsened by
a deteriorating morale of the troops. Keeping the services in top form is a
national commitment. When the nation is proud of its services and supports them
and respects them and treats them distinctly with the privileges they
deserve it is a lot easier to implement the rigors of discipline by
setting example and leading the system.
I
fear many more accidents and mishaps in every service, including perhaps the
reluctance to fight can be the result if this system failure if analysis is not
carried out on priority basis by India. The basics of the system approach in
ISO 9001:2008 would help the country put the house in order.
No
one likes to die. The military leadership leads the men by training in peace
time to reach a level where the men have the morale to fight including to happily
sacrifice for a cause. This demand for high morale in the troops is a national
requirement and demands support at the national level.
I can sum it up with my past experience in the
Indian Navy, including accidents seen by me in the Indian Navy’s submarine arm,
including a nuclear accident which was never really publicly analyzed and
would say that India may rise above from this tragedy a better force if the fundamentals of objectivity in using the system are utilized. India has operated submarines safely in the past. The
Indian Submarine arms safety record is exemplary. It is because
procedures were always followed howsoever uncomfortable and inconvenient. The
subs are safe till complacency sets in and makes the crew forget that they can
be dangerous!
What happened in this case may never really be
made public. Though I think the SOPs (Standard Operating Procedures) may have been neglected. You cannot be arming the fish (torpedoes) or any
other weaponry on a/ with a duty watch. The submarine should be at
action stations. From the death toll it is apparent they were not at action
stations. Easy then to blame the CO (Commanding Officer) for this blunder!
Blame the individual and close the case. Hope not. Time to look at the system
failure at the highest levels.
The recent fire on the Russian Nuclear Submarine is another example.
ReplyDeletehttp://www.maritime-executive.com/article/Flames-Erupt-on-Russian-Nuclear-Submarine-2013-09-16/
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ReplyDeleteFrom: Ranjit Rai
Date: Tue, Sep 3, 2013 at 3:08 PM
Subject: Re: Navy Totally At Sea !!!!!!!/ IJ's Blog
To: Inderjit Arora
Dear IJ,
Lovely to hear from you and I am educated and may write a bit on the subject.
Few years ago I read Capt Ternov's book and wrote an article which included the
fire on Chakra you mention. See below extract and I hear it was a heroic saving by the crew
and now I learn you were on board. I guess Ganesh or Anand was CO. Please tell me details
of the accident as I know Adm Bhasin did the BOI.
Hope you are doing well as after good years till 2007 India is going down hill with
corruption and no leadership.
RR
TWO NUCLEAR INS CHAKRAS FROM RUSSIA WITH LOVE AND MUCH MORE. CAPTAIN TERENOV’S BOOK REVEALS IT ALL
Cmde(Retd) Ranjit Bhawnani Rai ( A version in FORCE Magazine June 2012)
The full exciting, and detailed story of the ‘ups and downs’ including a devastating accident and fire in 1989 which was superbly controlled on board Project 670 Charlie class K-43 Russian nuclear powered submarine that was taken on a three year lease from 1988 to 1991 and named INS Chakra S-71 by the Indian Navy, is narrated by Capt Alexander Ivanovich Terenov in his gripping book titled Under Three Flags The Saga of the Submarine Cruiser K-43/Chakra........
The book describes how on 3rd February, 1988 PM Rajiv Gandhi received and embarked the Chakra off Vishakapatnam and the submarine dived while the PM had lunch with the officers and the Coxswain with pull burger moustaches . This Senior Executive Sailor receives accolades, for his handling of operations and the crew. Whilst in Indian waters the Russians put many officers and sailors through the paces of nuclear safety and high professionalism which is required of a nuclear submariner and the Chakra was freely exploited for 72,000 nautical miles (133,000km), and the reactor was active for 430 days with five missile and 42 torpedo firings executed under Indian command with Russian supervision on board for safety.
An accident and fire on board the vessel in 1989 when Chakra dived on its own from 40 feet to 200 feet was contained by joint heroic action, and the fire put off and there was no radioactive leakage to the submarine or the environment, and the submarine returned to base on its own possibly diesel power as the reactor must have been scrammed.
Repairs supported by the Russian safety crew and naval dockyard and representatives of the Afrikantov design bureau took three months to complete and is a moving naval story of joint dedication by the Russians and Indians involved.
Speculation is not the answer
ReplyDeleteVICE-ADMIRAL (RETD) K. N. SUSHIL
Part 1
The Navy has much at stake in a thorough investigation of the INS Sindhurakshak incident as officers and sailors need to be assured that the fault lines have been found and rectified
Just before midnight on August 13, two explosions rocked the INS Sindhurakshak and a huge ball of fire escaping from the conning tower hatch, the only hatch that is left open in the harbour, lit the night sky. Briefly thereafter, the submarine sank alongside. The 18 crew members who formed the duty watch were missing. Since the flame came out of the conning tower hatch nobody in these areas would have survived. There might have been a possibility of survivors had any of the sailors been in the aftermost compartments, but normally, in harbour nobody goes to the aft compartments except on periodic rounds. The nature of the incident, the loss of the submarine and the tragic loss of lives of those 18 ill-fated crew members makes it vital for the Navy to find the exact cause of the accident.
It is very easy in such incidents to jump to conclusions and air pet theories. Sabotage, problems with the modifications, hydrogen explosion or a handling accident that set off the chain of events are some of the theories being floated — the most tempting of these being the sabotage theory because that makes the incident an open-and-shut case. We should not fall for or be distracted by pet theories. To find the truth, the Navy needs to determine for itself not only the cause of this incident but also put in place procedures and precautions that would ensure such incidents never recur. Sailors and naval officers also must be assured that we can determine the fault lines and set them right so that they have the confidence to continue to work in the potentially dangerous environment that exists on board any submarines.
Speculation is not the answer
ReplyDeleteVICE-ADMIRAL (RETD) K. N. SUSHIL
Part 2
From available information, the submarine was being prepared for an operational deployment and was expected to sail early in the morning. The entire crew was scheduled to arrive on board at about 0300 hrs to prepare the submarine for sea. The full outfit of 18 weapons in this type of submarine consists of a mixture of missiles, oxygen torpedoes and electric torpedoes. Of these, six are stowed in the tubes and 12 on racks in the torpedo compartment. Normally, weapons kept on the racks are not “armed.” This means mechanisms and devices that are required to detonate the high explosives in the warheads are not placed in them, thus rendering them safe.
Taking into consideration that only two explosions were heard, that would mean the remaining 16 warheads, each containing approximately 250 kg of HE, did not explode. This indicates that the inherent stability and safety of the warhead’s design played a vital role in mitigating collateral damage.
Initial assessment
Going by where the flame came out, the explosion originated in the torpedo room, and not from the tubes. Of the two explosions, the first one, or the “trigger,” could not have been a warhead explosion (which, given the design, could have happened only had there been a tremendous shock to the unarmed weapons). Considering that heat and flame intensity would have been much higher after a second explosion, and that it did not cause a further 16 explosions, the second too could not have been a warhead explosion. Therefore, prima facie the trigger explosion appears to be from the weapon fuel — i.e. either oxygen from the torpedo or the booster of the missile. Anyhow what is important is that apparently damaging explosions were caused just from the trigger source and the adjacent weapon. Other weapons do not appear to have contributed to the damage. The Board of Inquiry, I am sure, will concentrate on these issues.
Speculation is not the answer
ReplyDeleteVICE-ADMIRAL (RETD) K. N. SUSHIL
Part 3
Normally an investigation would have recourse to various materials, log books and eyewitness accounts. In this incident, the spread of the flame from the forward compartments to the control would have incinerated everything. Reconstructing the events that led to the accident would be difficult, to say the least. Therefore the board will have to depend on advanced forensics to help it analyse the incident. Essentially this would entail chemical analysis of various materials to see if we can determine the nature of fuel that caused the burn. A lot of valuable evidence will lie in the debris of the fore ends. Much of this will be diluted by the sea water and most of it will be lost in the pumping out that will have to be done to bring the submarine to the surface. The Board of Inquiry will need to take advice from experts in forensic chemical and accident investigation to chalk out a course of action to collect samples before it is too late.
Damage control
The damage control design basis of the submarines provides for survival and maintenance of sufficient reserve of buoyancy when the pressure hull is breached and one compartment is fully flooded and two adjacent ballast tanks are destroyed. When this happens, the submarine is trimmed for neutral buoyancy. The submarine puts on a diving trim by flooding various tanks only when at sea, so as to avoid having to flood the tanks with the dirty water in the harbour. Therefore, Sindhurakshak would have been 100 tonnes lighter than its normal diving trim. Despite this the submarine sank alongside. Nobody can provide a design basis that would allow flotation under conditions that existed on the Sindhurakshak on that fateful night.
What is worrying is that had the accident occurred when the submarine was out at sea, the death toll would have been devastating and there would have been no chance of salvaging any part of it. The Navy does not have any submarine rescue capability. The Deep Submergence Rescue Vehicle programme has not borne results even 13 years after the Kursk incident. There was much hot air after the Russian disaster but we still do not have the capability.
The Chief of Naval Staff said we should hope for the best and prepare for the worst. It is high time that we equip ourselves for the worst and also teach ourselves to ensure that we have the best.
(The writer, who retired as Flag officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Southern Naval Command, was a submariner who served on Foxtrot and Shishumar-class submarines. He was Flag Officer Submarines and ACNS (Subs) before becoming Inspector General, Nuclear Safety in the Navy.)
Captain Arora and Admiral Sushil, this is an excellent discussion thread. These type of serious incidents are important examples for the QA practioner and student of conduct of operations to study. Thank you for beginning this thread. Please do keep us informed as additonal information comes to light.
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