The Sindhuratna Accident: A System Failure in the Indian Ministry of Defense

Resignation of the CNS (Chief of Naval Staff) of the Indian Navy (IN) a System Failure:

In the August 30, 2013 blog I wrote about the explosion on board the INS Sindhurakshak, a Russian built Kilo class submarine as a part of the Indian Navy submarine arm and the tragic death of 18 of its crew. My assessment of this being a system failure is now quite substantiated by the ill-fated accident on the INS Sindhuratna, another Russian built Kilo class submarine, which took the lives of two officers, and consequent resignation of Admiral DK Joshi as the CNS. I knew DK personally; we were students in the ASW specialization training in Cochin. A very fine upright officer let down by a failed system. Dr. Deming said: “a bad system will let down a good man every time”.

The ill-fated Sindhuratna was commissioned into the Indian Navy on November 19, 1988. The Russians operated the boat for about a year on trials and weapons testing before handing it over to India. On the date of  the accident the sub had effectively been in service for 26 years. These boats  are usually sent for a half-life (10 to 12 years) refit to Russia or done by the Indians in Vishakhapatnam, depending on the capacity of the dockyard. The major refit virtually rebuilds the submarine from its casing to the pressure hull. All hull valves are serviced and/or replaced and where advances have taken place new weaponry and sensors are replaced. The sub after such a refit is good for another 10 years. The pattern is similar to ships in the mercantile marine where the full term certificate is issued for 5 years (Clause 13.7 of ISM Code) and the ships maintained accordingly. Today most good ship registries as the Liberian ship registry will not register a vessel older than 20 years. However the Indian Navy squeezed out another two years of service from this boat. And finally the active life of this submarine ended in December 2013. Yet the submarine was operating…

The Achilles heel in a conventional submarine is its set of batteries. A Kilo class submarine is driven by 240 batteries, each weighing 800 kilograms. The batteries provide a service life of 200 fully charged to fully discharged cycles or exactly 4 years whichever comes first, and then they are due for change. The older batteries do not provide the juice necessary for running under water, require frequent charging, and emit excessive hydrogen and pollute the atmoshers inside quickly. The chlorine vapors and leaking electrolyte are hardly congenial to creating the safe work environment for performance as a warship (ISO 9001:2008 clause6.4).

 The Sindhuratna's batteries in use had completed their life cycle in December 2012. Lack of planning, and incorrect implementation of a system approach to managing such a vital arm of the Navy is adversely affected by a non-committed incompetent top management (TM) both at the ministerial level and at the administrative level. Even if the IN is projecting these requirements the TM still rests in the ministry where the defense minister may not even understand the nuances of the requirements. Further, interference in the safety levels occurs when the national operational requirements remain unchanged in spite of the navy’s underwater arm being  hugely depleted. This result in the IN pressurized to stretch the service life of these aged submarines with batteries which are a ticking bomb. In this particular case, it is reported that the  Sindhuratna underwent a minor refit over the last four months and it was on its first sea trial or Task 2 sea examination before it could be re-inducted into active service. It was however at sea with these batteries whose service life had expired! Batteries which should have been junked 15 months ago. Has not the IN had accidents or near misses before related to old batteries? 

So the question is why are the submarines being sailed in this state? Why were the batteries not replaced timely? Surely the CNS would have asked for these from the Ministry of Defense (MoD). The Defense Minister (DM) needs to understand the part that batteries play, even if he is just a political head, he needs the administrative organization to explain this to him and meet the Naby’s requirements. The ship didn’t get new batteries because the procurement process of the MoD failed. It perhaps did not take the CNS’s inputs correctly. When repeated accidents occur, the CNS is aware more accidents will follow because the system in the MoD has failed. He however has no recourse or face to show his men as to why he is sending them out in unsafe vessels. Thus his resignation.

A system which is failing needs to recognize the root cause of the failure. Who is responsible for this sad state of affairs? Clearly the MoD. Battery projections for the submarines are not made at the last minute. Naval Headquarters (NHQ) processes these requests timely and at least 3 to 4 years in advance. In any case battery requirements are periodic and well known to a country which has been operating submarines since 1967. The fleet is required to have a set of batteries as a reserve. It is therefore a system failure at the national level. Authorities higher than the CNS need to take responsibility and then the new incumbent should look at the system failure. There is no room for politics in such matters of national importance. If the nation’s defense forces lose faith in the system, then the loss of morale cannot be far away. “Morale is to physical as two is to one” - Napoleon. 

There is an urgent case for studying the system that runs the navy. The resignation of the CNS is a good example but not the solution.

MLC 2006: The end of the CDC …

A CDC (Continuous Discharge Certificate) or 'Seamen’s Book' as it is also called, is a very important document for seafarers; it is an immediate recognition of a mariner. A passport holds importance on land but for those on the high seas a CDC holds more value. However, the life cycle of the CDC is probably nearing its end with the ratification of MLC 2006.

Article 5 of ILO Convention No. 22 of 1926, states that seafarers shall be given a document showing the period of service performed on each ship. In compliance with this article Flag States issue the Seamen Book or CDC as an Identification document to seafarers. A Seafarers Identity Document (C-185) issued by the Flag State slowly became accepted as the main identity for mariners globally.  This eased the cumbersome old method of seafarers carrying several pieces of discharge certificates. The CDC, as a single document, also provides objective service information for the next employer. It is also helpful as evidence of sea-service while going for higher examination/ certification. CDC’s were never intended for use as a travel document. A passport still remains the only legitimate travel document. This should be substantiated by a Discharge Book while traveling to and from ships across other countries.

The ratification of MLC 2006 is ushering in several changes to the maritime community at large. The MLC-2006 references the Continuous Discharge Certificate in A-2.1.e. It states that a CDC could be issued by the Flag State of the seafarer. Germany, in its interpretation, will now stop issuing seaman's books, as indicated by the German Maritime Authority (BSH). The other Flag States may follow lead but there is still no clear guideline from IMO on this.

International law does not require seafarers to have a seaman's book. Mariners, as any citizen of a country, can travel to other countries using their passports and visas. In the past there were concessions operating in several countries that allowed seafarers to arrive, join and leave ships with minimum formalities and a seaman's book often did the job. Flag administrations certifying mariners require them to provide evidence of their sea experience when seeking re-validation of certificates or new certificates. That can be easily done by a paper record from each ship. The CDC merely consolidates it. Sadly over the years, many flag states, especially the big open registries, have seen seaman's books as a revenue source. Thus many of them have requirements in national law that requires all seafarers on their ships to have national CDCs.

Today with electronic records readily available for instant verification the requirement of the CDC is indeed becoming more a hindrance than a requirement which serves any useful purpose. Germany has shown the way; perhaps a bit early as the rest of the world has to catch up to this. There are some countries which recognize mariners only based on their possessing a CDC. German seafarers and those who follow Germany in this may find it difficult. It will have to be an international decision with universal applicability if this is to be the future.

I still have my CDC and am nostalgic about it considering the lengths I had to go to acquire one from the Indian Authorities. Its future probably lies in a maritime museum somewhere!